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ABSTRACT
Our primary purpose in this article is to draw upon the literature of classical liberal economy to show how it informs and is informed by the results
from experimental economics. Adam Smith’s ﬁrst great book, The Theory
of Moral Sentiments, serves as our chief source of insights for understanding
and interpreting modern laboratory research in terms of the conventions that
govern human conduct in personal exchange. At the same time, we wish to
demonstrate how today’s economic experiments elucidate a reading of Adam
Smith.

If he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into
the principles of his conduct. . . he must. . . humble the arrogance of his
self-love, and bring it down to something which other men can go along
with.
Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, II.ii.2.1, p. 83.
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Introduction

Contrary to the popular belief, Adam Smith did not argue, famously or infamously,
that humans are primarily motivated by self-interest, as is quite explicit in the
epigraph. Even in The Wealth of Nations (hereafter, WN), he spoke not of the selfinterest but of one’s “own interest” which includes prudence, but is always mediated
by what “other men can go along with.”1 Smith renowned-ly says that “[i]t is not
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to
their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities
but of their advantages” (WN, I.ii.2, pp. 26–27). But acting in one’s “own interest”
need not entail putting one’s own interest above another’s interest in commerce,
which is what acting with self-interest quite fundamentally means then and now.
A deeper reading of WN reveals Smith’s implied qualiﬁcation of “own interest,”
for appealing to the self-love of the butcher, the brewer, and the baker means
“allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way, upon the liberal
plan of equality, liberty and justice” (WN, IV.ix.3, p. 664). If that qualiﬁcation is
unpersuasive, he elaborates later when discussing competition: “Every man, as long
as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own
interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition
with those of any other man, or order of men” (WN, IV.ix.51, p. 687).2 Thus, if
the modern economist espouses naked self-interest as the foundation for economic
decision making, he or she does so incompatibly with the founding father of the
discipline and more generally with the genius of the Scottish Enlightenment.
Smith’s friend, David Hume, likewise circumscribes market behavior within rules
when he distinguishes interested commerce, what North (1990, 2005) calls impersonal (market) exchange, from disinterested commerce, or what North calls personal
(social) exchange. In the eighteenth century, while the ﬁrst meaning of interest is
“concern, advantage, good”, the fourth meaning, which applies here, is “regard
to private proﬁt” (Johnson, 1755). Hume recognizes that promises were invented
for interested commerce to “bind ourselves to the performance of any action”
(1740, 3.2.5, p. 335). While with disinterested commerce we “may still do services
1

2

Tellingly, Book 5 in Volume 2 is the ﬁrst and last time Smith uses the word “self-interest” and
then it is to describe “the industry and zeal of the inferior clergy [in Rome]” (p. 789).
Mandeville, who irreverently founded economic decision making on the vice of self-love in his
poem, The Fable of the Bees, and whose satirical, tongue-in-cheek humor scandalized Smith,
nevertheless still concluded: “So Vice is beneﬁcial found, / When it’s by Justice lopt and
bound” (1705).
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to such person as I love, and am more particularly acquainted with, without any
prospect of advantage; and they may make me a return in the same manner, without any view but that of recompensing my past services,” the same is not true of
our impersonal intercourses. We precisely engage in mutually beneﬁting and impersonal exchange for the distinct prospect of a private proﬁt, and we voluntarily do
so only with promises, “the sanction of interested commerce of mankind” (Hume,
1740, 3.2.5, p. 335).
Our primary purpose in this essay is to draw upon the literature of classical liberal economy to show how it informs and is informed by results from experimental
economics. In particular, we focus on disinterested commerce, which, like interested
commerce, is circumscribed by rules. Johnson (1755) deﬁnes disinterested as “superior to regard of private advantage; not inﬂuenced by private proﬁt.” Importantly,
superior can connote a sense of being “greater in dignity or excellence” (Johnson,
1755). Adam Smith’s ﬁrst great book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (hereafter,
TMS), serves as our chief source of insights for understanding and interpreting
modern laboratory research in terms of the conventions that govern human conduct in personal exchange. At the same time, we wish to demonstrate how today’s
economic experiments elucidate a reading of Adam Smith.
Inﬂuenced by Newton and astronomy, Smith was concerned with the power of
rule-governed systems that function beneath human sensible awareness to organize
observations, and sought to develop such a system for the social foundations of
morality.3 His project in TMS is to acutely discern how our moral sentiments emerge
out of human interactive experience to form a system of general rules that wisely
orders society4 :
3

4

See his History of Astronomy (Smith, 1795). This work was published posthumously; that it
was written prior to 1758, the year before TMS was to be published is indicated by Smith
himself in the text of Section (IV. 74) noting that Newton’s followers have predicted the return
of a comet in 1758, adding in a footnote that this statement had been written earlier, and
that subsequently “the return of the comet had occurred agreeably to the prediction.” Smith is
referring to Halley’s Comet that appears on schedule about every 76 years — a prediction whose
conﬁrmation was truly mind-bending for any remaining eighteenth century skeptics of Newton.
Prior to the publication of his two books in 1759 and 1776, Smith was clearly enamored by the
ability of Newtonian theory to provide an orderly account of observations from the physical
world (Smith, 1759, 1776).
The ramiﬁcations of this point are lost to those who thumb through TMS for quotations that
justify post hoc their modern research. In a well-known thought experiment, Smith considers
how a European “who had no sort of connexion” with China would respond to hearing that a
dreadful earthquake had struck this remote land. Ashraf et al. (2005) use this section of TMS to
discuss how “Smith argued that natural sympathy often falls short of what is morally justiﬁed
by mass misery” (p. 134). But Smith is not discussing moral justiﬁcation in Part III. He is
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The general maxims of morality are formed, like all other general maxims, from experience and induction. We observe in a great variety of
particular cases what pleases or displeases our moral faculties, what
these approve or disapprove of, and, by induction from this experience,
we establish those general rules (TMS, VII.iii.2.6, p. 319).
Smith, however, warned that in these maxims, arising “by experience and induction,” we should never confuse their functional eﬃciency with their cause, i.e., the
general rules from induction are not the consequence of applying reason or deliberate human design:
In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest
artiﬁce to the ends which they are intended to produce . . . But though,
in accounting for the operations of bodies, we never fail to distinguish
in this manner the eﬃcient from the ﬁnal cause, in accounting for those
of the mind we are very apt to confound these two diﬀerent things with
one another. When by natural principles we are led to advance those
ends, which a reﬁned and enlightened reason would recommend to us,
we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their eﬃcient cause,
the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends. . . (TMS,
II.ii.3.5, p. 87).
In this, Hume was in full agreement, as the rule of justice and of property “. . . arises
gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience
of the inconveniences of transgressing it” (Hume, 1740, III.2.2.10, p. 315).
Thus, as Smith and his intellectual contemporaries appreciated, “Man [both the
individual and the species] is made for society” and the peace of that society
depends upon morality (Ferguson, 1792, p. 199). Moreover, the rules of morality, as Hume explains, “are not arbitrary” (Hume, 1740, III.2.1.19, p. 311), and
discussing “the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct,
and of the Sense of Duty” (p. 109). This is conﬁrmed four pages later when Smith carefully
explains that “[a]ll men, even those at the greatest distance, are no doubt entitled to our good
wishes, and our good wishes we naturally give them. But if, notwithstanding, they should be
unfortunate, to give ourselves any anxiety upon that account, seems to be no part of our duty.
That we should be but little interested, therefore, in the fortune of those whom we can neither
serve nor hurt, and who are in every respect so very remote from us, seems wisely ordered
by Nature” (TMS, III.iii.9, p. 140, italics added). Smith is modeling the conduct expressed in
our actions. In that model we are disciplined by judgments that focus our attention on issues
where our actions can make a diﬀerence—serve or hurt—through our choices.
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from Smith: “Vice is always capricious: virtue only is regular and orderly” (TMS,
VI.ii.1.18, p. 225). In the language of Hayek, the leading twentieth century scholar
the core of whose work continued in the Scottish tradition, we are speaking of
spontaneous order mediated by the community-grown rules of interaction in small
familial-like groups (Hayek, 1988, p. 18).
We report results from a variety of two-person laboratory experiments motivated
originally by game-theoretic predictions. In these economic environments we see
property rights, in the sense of rights and wrongs of taking certain actions. In
personal exchange environments, these property rights are involved as mediators
of choice; i.e., they emerge as conventions, or a form of mutual consent, that are
recognized implicitly, or not, within the group by the interacting individuals, and
determine whether cooperative outcomes are realized or not. In impersonal market
exchange, these socially grown rights have become codiﬁed in externally imposed
and enforced rules, deﬁning an institution that governs exchange and outcomes.
This insight into the social origins of property rights is captured in Hayek’s quotation from Julius Paulus, a third century A.D. Roman jurist: “What is right is
not derived from the rule, but the rule arises from our knowledge of what is right”
(Hayek, 1973, p. 162).

2

Principles of Action in TMS

The arguments that follow make use of our interpretation of Adam Smith’s theory
of the mental and emotional states that serve to mediate the individual actions
that produce those states; accordingly, we provide a very brief overview of these
principles of action.
Humans desire and seek praise and praise-worthiness; also to avoid blame
and blame-worthiness (TMS, III.2.1, p. 114). Praise and praise-worthiness are
connected, but the latter is not derived from the former and the two are somewhat independent (TMS, III.2.2–III.2.3, p. 114). Thus praise yields little pleasure if, in ignorance or error, we judge it — via the impartial spectator — to
be undeserved (TMS, III.2.4, pp. 114–115). Similarly, we ﬁnd satisfaction in our
praise-worthy conduct, even if no such praise is likely to be bestowed on us (TMS,
III.2.5, pp. 115–116). In these passages it is important for modern economic readers
to avoid thinking of words like “satisfaction” and “pleasure” as being equivalent
to or yielding “utility,” which for Smith meant merely and only “useful” (TMS,
IV.1.6, p. 180). For Smith what was satisfying or pleasing was the conformance of
our conduct with social propriety in choosing an action.

6
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Concerning action in the self-interest, Smith followed the Stoics in arguing that
“self-love” is recommended to all by the requirements of self-preservation, but its
arrogant forms must at all times be humbled in order to pursue actions that conform
to the judgments of one’s impartial spectator (TMS, II.ii.2.1, pp. 82–83; VII.ii.1.15,
p. 272).5

3

The Impartial Spectator

Our actions are subject to a discipline of self-command by principles that operate
through the metaphor of the “fair and impartial spectator,” or simply the Impartial
Spectator:
We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair
and impartial spectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves
in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives
which inﬂuenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his
disapprobation, and condemn it (TMS, III.1.2, p. 110).
The words “fair,” “impartial,” and “equitable” were chosen, we believe, quite
deliberately by Smith to represent judgment by a neutral referee as to whether an
5

Formally, we might think of an action taken by individual i as depending on its propriety,
given the circumstances:
ai (Propriety|C) = ai (C)(PR) + βi (C)(PR) · (PW) + γi (C)(PW) + δi (C),
where PR and PW are (0, 1) indicator variables that an action deserves social praise (1), or not
(0), and is praise-worthy (1), or not (0); and αi , βi , γi , and δi are nonnegative functions. In the
second term, PW adds leverage to PR, while the third term expresses the TMS sentiment that
PW may yield stand-alone value even where it can never receive praise. C deﬁnes the circumstances — the game structure, including i’s choice alternatives and their payoﬀs. Each action
is based on conduct that is more or less satisfying or pleasing conditional on circumstances,
and the action chosen is the one of the most satisfactory according to these socially mediated
criteria. The term δi (C), independent of the social indicators, allows “self-love” to be part of
the evaluation of action. This function is deﬁned only on own payoﬀs. One implication is that
where i’s information is limited regarding the choice and/or payoﬀs of other, then i cannot infer
the intent of other and thereby reward beneﬁcence, although she may still value her decision as
praise-worthy; hence PR = 0, and δi (C) looms larger than otherwise in determining the choice.
A formal treatment similar to the above would apply where blame and blame-worthiness were
elements to be applied to the evaluation of some actions. Even where payoﬀs are large, self-love
may be constrained by considerations of blame and blame-worthiness.

Fair and Impartial Spectators in Experimental Economic Behavior

7

action was fair or foul under the applicable rules of interaction given the circumstances. Within Smith’s metaphor of the Impartial Spectator is the sports metaphor
of judgment under the rules of the game.6 Smith repeatedly makes reference to
actions that “other people” or “mankind,” or the “impartial spectator,” “can go
along with” (or not). The Impartial Spectator constitutes an internalization of what
is approved or not approved by others. We are encouraged to take actions that
others can go along with, and deterred from actions that they cannot and ﬁnd objectionable: others “always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of
(our) sentiments.” (TMS, III.1.3, p. 110) This characterization of human sociality
serves to mediate human action, however, imperfectly.7 As a social–psychological
restraint it emerges ﬁrst in our families, extended families, and friendship enclaves,
but ultimately appears in the laws codiﬁed by civil society (TMS, VI.ii.Introduction,
1, pp. 218–227; II.ii.2.2–II.ii2.3, pp. 83–85).
The Impartial Spectator enters in two ways: our judgments of the actions of
others and judgments of, and actions by, ourselves. Propositions concerning our
judgments of the actions of others include the following:
•

Properly motivated beneﬁcent actions alone require reward. Why? Because it is
these actions alone that inspire our gratitude (TMS, II.ii.1.1, p. 78).
• Improperly motivated hurtful actions alone deserve punishment. Why? Because
these actions alone provoke resentment (TMS, II.ii.1.2, p. 78).
• The want of beneﬁcence cannot provoke resentment.8 Why? Because beneﬁcence
is always free (voluntarily given) and “cannot be exhorted by force” (TMS,
II.ii.1.3, pp. 78–79).
In TMS the emotion of resentment has a central role in expressing disapproval
and emerges in human–social interactions, providing common experience and a
consensual foundation for rights to take action in social groupings. Thus, resentment
6

7

8

For a discussion on “fair” as playing within the rules of social practice, see Wilson (2012),
particularly footnote 7 which discusses the eighteenth century meaning of the word. Adam
Smith’s usage of “fairness” stands in sharp contrast to the interpretation and discussion in
Ashraf et al. (2005, pp. 136–137).
The Impartial Spectator is not, however, equivalent to our conscience because: “The word
conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove.
Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signiﬁes our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions” (TMS, VII.iii.3.15, p. 326).
Ashraf et al. (2005) miss this distinction in their reading of TMS when they explain that “[i]n
social situations, the impartial spectator plays the role of a conscience” (p. 132).
Thus, as we interpret it, if I pass an opportunity to trustingly beneﬁt you this would or would
not be the cause for your resentment. But if I should accept the opportunity, and you take
advantage of my trust, then I have just cause for resentment of your action.

8
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safeguards justice by provoking the punishment of an injustice already done to
another, while protecting against injustice by deterring others who fear punishment
if they commit a like oﬀence (TMS, II.ii.1.4–II.ii.1.5, pp. 79–80). Retaliation is a
law of Nature that requires the violator of the laws of justice to feel that evil done
to another; he who simply observes and does not violate the laws of justice merits
no reward, but only respect for his innocence (TMS, II.ii.1.9–II.ii.1.10, p. 82).
Judgments of, and actions by, ourselves are governed by the principles of approval
(disapproval) of our own conduct:
•

These reﬂect the judgments we apply to others as we endeavor to exchange,
mirror-like, our perspective with that of others, and “To see oursels as ithers see
us”9 in which we imagine our conduct examined by any other fair and impartial
spectator.
• We possess no other looking-glass with which to examine our own conduct.
• In this, each becomes as two persons — the ﬁrst is the Impartial Spectator, the
judge; the second is the agent, himself the person judged (TMS, III.1.2–III.1.6,
pp. 109–113).10

4

Traditional Game Theory and Experimental Economics

Initially, many of the experimental game results were motivated by game theory;
subsequently, experiments were designed to better understand why the initial results
so often deviated from game-theoretic predictions. Hence, we begin with a simple
reduced form representation of a game as in Sobel (2005). We then modify that
framework with a formalization that we believe corresponds more accurately to the
way Adam Smith constructed a process view of human sociality in TMS.
Suppose that individual i = 1, . . . , n selects an action, xi , in a stage game to
maximize Zi (x), where x = (x1 , . . . , xi , . . . , xn ) are strategy choices by n players:
Zi (x) = (1 − d)ui (x) + dVi [H(x)],

9

10

(1)

From Robert Burns, “Ode to a Louse.” Burns, we should note, was born in the year TMS was
published.
“We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behavior, and endeavor to imagine what eﬀect
it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in
some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct. If in
this view it pleases us, we are tolerably satisﬁed” (TMS, III.1.5, p. 112).
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where 1 > d > 0 is the discount rate, H(x) is the history of play, ui is i’s self-loving
“utility” outcome from the choice xi in the stage game, and Vi is the value to i of
continuation of play. (In the discussion below our examples are for n = 2 persons.)
Zi (x) is interpreted as the criterion of judgment for decision making by i in a
single sequential repetition of the same stage game with the same well-identiﬁed
other. Zi (x) is described as i’s discounted current plus future utility in a pairing
created by the experimenter. Hence, H(x) includes all past history, as well as the
shadow of i’s anticipated future history of play with other. As described by Sobel
(2005):
Repeated-game theory incorporates strategic context, not by changing
preferences but by changing the way people play. In order to obtain
equilibria distinct from repetitions of equilibria of the underlying static
game, the history of play must inﬂuence future play. History does not
inﬂuence preferences, but it does inﬂuence expectations about behavior
(p. 412).
To achieve this, actions may take the form of punishments and rewards, contingent on actions by other that shape the self-loving behavior of other so as to enable i
to maximize her long-term self-loving interest over the horizon of the repeated game.
In this development, Vi is an endogenous function of the history of play. If Vi is
positive and d is suﬃciently large (near enough to 1), then in maximizing Zi (x),
i must take care not to spoil her self-loving future interaction with this particular
other person by her choice in the present — a care that in traditional repeated
game theory exhausts the content of actions that are social; i.e., her sociality is
deﬁned and conﬁned relative to her historical and anticipated future interactions
with the particular person with whom she has been paired.
In game theory, repetition is essential for long-term strategic success in achieving
cooperative results, but laboratory experiments have long recorded signiﬁcant levels
of cooperation in single plays of a stage game in which the anonymous players forego
larger payoﬀ for themselves in favor (or expectations) of a cooperative outcome.
Therefore, as noted by Sobel (2005, p. 411), “[b]ecause laboratory experiments carefully control for repeated-game eﬀects, these results need a diﬀerent explanation.”
That is, in a single play of the stage game a rational i is assumed to set Vi = 0
when matched with an unknown other person and therefore is presumed to be a
“stranger” who person i cannot identify and thereby build on any relevant past
personal history. Hence, both i and the other are predicted to choose self-loving
dominant outcomes, whatever the circumstances deﬁned by the game.

10
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The “diﬀerent explanation” commonly oﬀered for experimentally observed cooperative outcomes is the postulate of other-regarding or “social preferences” that
rationalize the observed behavior by each player attributing own utility (or envious
disutility) to money assigned to other, as well as money assigned to one’s self in a
single play of the stage game.
In this explanation any generosity, positive or negative, has been accounted for by
simply augmenting post hoc the decision maker’s utility function in an appropriate
way. But we cannot infer utility from decision choice. The “if” in the scientiﬁc
proposition “if preferences are social then choices will be other regarding” is replaced
by “if and only if.” It is the latter proposition that has been widely adopted by
theorists and experimenters since the predictive failures of game theory started to
accumulate.
Adam Smith carefully and thoughtfully modeled human interactions of this kind,
not as governed by own versus other utilitarian considerations, but by conduct —
rules conditioned by propriety.11 In following these principles the individual is
pleased by the actions driven by her self-judgment, but “pleased” does not map
into a utilitarian reward. Even if one can identify a formal case-by-case technical
equivalence between outcome utilities and actions motivated by conduct rules, following such mechanical curve ﬁtting involves an omitted essential step, and risks
failing to articulate a process that disciplines our understanding of how and why
context matters in games and life.12 Adam Smith, who believed TMS was his most
important work, provides a meaningful systematic approach to experimental testing
as an alternative to extending utilitarianism.
In Equation (1), if H is “history,” decision must be informed by one’s entire
cultural and past social experience, and the exploration of this social experience may
expose thinking to nonpreference-based forms of other-regarding behavior. In this
11

12

Wilson (2008, 2010) uses the insights of Wittgenstein to make the related point that rules of
conduct cannot be represented by utilitarian preferences, but are rather embedded in language
games, the lifelong social intercourse that each of us has with the rest of humankind. The
Impartial Spectator is Adam Smith’s version of that intercourse with oneself.
Evidence of the failure of utilitarianism is prominent in the ubiquitous observation that varying
payoﬀs for a given context matters much less than varying the contextual circumstances given
payoﬀs. See Camerer (2003, pp. 60–61) for a report of the minor eﬀects on ultimatum game
outcomes of varying the stakes by factors of 10 and much higher; and Falk et al. (2007) for an
examination of the importance of intentions. In Hoﬀman et al. (1994), ultimatum game choices
vary signiﬁcantly with circumstances, whereas in Hoﬀman et al. (1996) a 10-fold increase in
payoﬀ levels yields an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on choices. Yet, these games have been ritualistically modeled by attempts to reﬁt explanatory utility functions to the shifting circumstances
recorded by experiments.
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development, actions are only intelligible in reference to moral judgments of own
and other actions in past and anticipated future interactions. What is important
about the actions is the conduct (including intentions) they signal and not merely
the outcomes the actions yield.
Such a pathway is provided by Smith’s program in TMS. That pathway includes
not only a continuation value, that we will now call Wi [H(x)] where the stage game
is to be repeated, but also sympathetically modiﬁes the self-loving ﬁrst term, ui (x),
in Equation (1). Moreover, Wi is now based on expected future conduct, both own
and other, and not only on outcomes.
In TMS, individuals are motivated to seek praise and praise-worthiness, and to
avoid blame and blame-worthiness, in all social interactions. And in judging her
own conduct, a person i will always imagine that conduct as being examined by
a fair and impartial spectator. Her actions will vary with circumstances, based on
past experience, but require that her conduct serve personal long-term (reputation)
ends across a wide variety of human social encounters. When she knows little of
a particular other she may be cautious, and more preserving of immediate Stoic
care for herself, but, even so, she knows it is another human, recruited from a
group whose characteristics may not be that dissimilar from her own, and she
relies on self-command principles that have served her well on average in the past.
Her action xi will generate a current value that we will designate Ui [x|Hi (0)],
where Hi (0) is her current entry-level personal historical state (after reading the
instructions of the experiment). Ui values i’s conduct in taking immediate action
xi ; part of that valuation is the resulting payoﬀs. But the value attained is derived
from the judgment of the Impartial Spectator as to the propriety of her action,
albeit including that the payoﬀs are deserved and justiﬁed by the circumstances.
That our description of Ui [x|Hi (0)] captures baseline elements in Smith’s criterion
for weighing the present against the future by a prudent person, under the selfcommanding judgment of the Impartial Spectator, seems plainly evident in the
following quotation:
. . . in his steadily sacriﬁcing the ease and enjoyment of the present
moment for the probable expectation of the still greater ease and enjoyment of a more distant but more lasting period of time, the prudent
man is always both supported and rewarded by the entire approbation
of the impartial spectator, and of the representative of the impartial
spectator, the man within the breast. The impartial spectator does not
feel himself worn out by the present labour of those whose conduct he
surveys; nor does he feel himself solicited by the importunate calls of

12
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their present appetites. To him their present, and what is likely to be
their future situation, are very nearly the same: he sees them nearly at
the same distance, and is aﬀected by them very nearly in the same manner. He knows, however, that to the persons principally concerned, they
are very far from being the same, and that they naturally aﬀect them
in a very diﬀerent manner. He cannot therefore but approve, and even
applaud, that proper exertion of self-command, which enables them to
act as if their present and their future situation aﬀected them nearly in
the same manner in which they aﬀect him (TMS, VI.i.11, p. 215).
Instead of Equation (1) we now have a sympathy-derived criterion of action
Si (x) = (1 − d)Ui [x|Hi (0)] + dWi [H(x)]

(2)

If Wi = 0, as in an advertised one-shot game, max Si (x) does not reduce to max
Zi (x); that would occur only for an i raised in isolation from all contact with other
humans, or who is otherwise barren of all socialization: “To a man who from his
birth was a stranger to society, the objects of his passions, the external bodies
which either pleased or hurt him, would occupy his whole attention” (TMS, III.1.3,
p. 110).
With Wi > 0, Equation (2) allows action to accommodate the knowledge that
the interaction will be repeated, and thereby enables the relationship with other to
be inﬂuenced by possible futures that the two are able to create beyond the selfcommand principles that would apply to a single encounter which already contains
baseline considerations of futurity as in the above quote from TMS. Under repetition, judgments by the Impartial Spectator of each person in their shared interaction
will be updated based on how each reads the intentions conveyed sequentially by
the other.

5

Ultimatum Games

In this game people are recruited to the lab in groups, say of 12, and are randomized
into pairs, and at random one person is selected to be the Proposer, the other the
Responder. The task of each pair is to determine the allocation of a ﬁxed sum of
money, M , say $10 or $100 (consisting of 10 $1 bills or 10 $10 bills) between them,
under the following rules: the Proposer chooses an amount, y for herself, with the
understanding that M − y is allocated to the Responder. Play then passes to the
Responder, who either accepts the allocation, in which case the indicated payments
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will be made to each, or he rejects the allocation, in which case each receives zero
from the interaction.13 The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game is for
the Proposer to oﬀer $1 (the minimum unit of account), and for the Responder
to accept. The latter should accept any amount that is better than zero, and, in
awareness of this, the Proposer oﬀers that amount. The data tend to show very
high rejection rates of $1, and rejections of amounts up to $3 are not uncommon.
But Proposers appear to anticipate this behavior and very few oﬀer low amounts.
In experiments described as a “Divide $M” game the average oﬀer is commonly
about 45% of M , but oﬀers change substantially with variations in the context and
instructions (Smith, 2008; Camerer, 2003).
The ﬁrst thought, for those schooled in TMS, might be that this behavior suggests
that the Impartial Spectator of each player is at work evaluating the propriety of
their actions. But this is a strange game to consider as a test of the propositions
from TMS summarized above. Smith informs us emphatically that, “Beneﬁcence
is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no
punishment; because the mere want of beneﬁcence tends to do no real positive evil”
(II.ii.1.3, p. 78). Rethinking the Ultimatum Game in this light, we can say:
•
•
•
•

•

•
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As in most lab experiments, people are recruited to the lab not knowing the
experiment that is to occupy them.
They arrive and are not oﬀered a choice between alternative experimental games.
These procedures are carefully designed to control for self-selection bias, but as
we see, other conditions may be inadvertently controlled for.
These procedures, however, are hardly sacred: the ﬁrst rule of any experimentalist
should be that the experiment and its design be relevant to its purpose. One
should backward induct from the purpose, and the question, to the design of the
experiment.
Playing the ultimatum game does not constitute a voluntary action. Have we
gathered much data on pairs of “reluctant duelists,” without this being part of
our intention?
Borrowing Adam Smith’s words, should we not think of the Ultimatum Game
as an “extortion game.” The Proposer under the terms of his participation must
decide on y, with M − y awarded to the Responder. Is her choice motivated by
beneﬁcence? Is the Responder rewarding beneﬁcence by his acceptance of M − y?
Is he punishing “want of beneﬁcence” by rejecting it?
The Ultimatum Game originated with Guth et al. (1982) and has spawned a vast literature.
See for example, Forsythe et al. (1994), Hoﬀman et al. (1994, 1996) and for a partial survey,
Camerer (2003, pp. 48–59).
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The circumstances of the game — to which the Impartial Spectator must always
be sensitive in the light of past experience — are such that our answers to these
questions are surely, “No,” or at least “Mmm.” From the perspective of TMS this
is a mixed motive game.

These considerations cannot be dismissed with the convenient ex post argument
that “in many situations one must play a game, even against one’s wishes.”14 Rather
the question is whether or not it is useful to think about the ultimatum game from a
broader perspective, such as that in TMS, for there are experiments showing clearly
that it matters how one arrives at the circumstance of deciding on a take-it-or-leaveit oﬀer. Salmon and Wilson (2008) is a case on point. In their experiment motivated
by observations on eBay, they embed an ultimatum game in a context of multiple
buyers competing for purchases from a single seller. The seller has two units of
the same good for sale, the ﬁrst of which is auctioned oﬀ to the highest bidder
in a typical English (ascending price) auction. For the second unit, the seller then
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the bidder with the highest losing bid (the second
highest bidder). If the buyer accepts, she receives a proﬁt equal to the diﬀerence
between her randomly drawn value and the seller’s oﬀer. If she rejects, neither the
seller nor the buyer earn anything on that unit.
Salmon and Wilson ﬁnd that in a treatment with only two competing bidders,
only 12 out of 273 oﬀers (4.4%) are rejected. Moreover, 93 of those oﬀers are greater
than the buyer’s ﬁnal (but losing) bid, and only 6 of those are rejected. In other
words, the seller is attempting to extract even more surplus out of the buyer and
the buyers still do not reject the oﬀers. With four bidders, 111 proﬁtable oﬀers
are made to the bidders and only 4 (3.6%) are rejected. But here’s the kicker.
The median accepted surplus is a mere 61c and 39c in the two- and four-bidder
treatments, respectively. In contrast, Hoﬀman et al. (1994) ﬁnd that 10.4% of all
oﬀers are rejected, usually for amounts of $2 and $3, even when the ultimatum
game is framed as a one-shot buyer–seller negotiation over a price.15
Why are the Salmon and Wilson results so strikingly diﬀerent relative to the
standard ultimatum game? Because, in our interpretation of TMS, the ultimatum
game over the second unit is not a game of extortion mixed with beneﬁcence from
receiving a windfall. The second unit is a game of prudence with an immediate
14
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The quotation is from Ellsberg (1956) who notes that minimax strategies were not satisfactory
solutions to zero-sum games, because if that were the solution to playing the game, and a
person had the option to refuse play, then “[h]e would never play” (p. 922).
Hoﬀman et al. (1996) report rejections of $30 oﬀered from stakes of $100; Cherry and List
(2000) report rejections of oﬀers of $100 where the stakes are $400.
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prior history, and the context that invokes the virtue of prudence is distinct from
those that call for the virtues of beneﬁcence or justice (TMS, Part VI). There is
no open-ended question as to whether the seller is being beneﬁcent enough with
his oﬀer to the buyer because she is not beneﬁcently splitting a windfall with the
buyer. She is prudently attempting to sell the second unit of a commodity to a
buyer who could not pay as much as some other buyer for the ﬁrst unit. Unlike
the traditional ultimatum game, we observe that there is simply no beneﬁcence to
assess in a seller’s take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer.
Likewise, there is also no room for resentment of the seller’s oﬀer, for
“[r]esentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence
only” (II.ii.i.4, p. 79). In a reluctant game of extortion, a Proposer may go too far
in extracting money from the windfall and thus an oﬀer of $2 may “prompt us to
beat oﬀ the mischief which is attempted to be done to us, and to retaliate that
which is already done” (II.ii.i.4, p. 79). But in the Salmon and Wilson markets,
where is the mischief on the part of the seller? The buyer has just demonstrated
that he is unwilling to name and pay a price as high as someone else and in the
process he has revealed approximately how much he is willing to spend. So, when
faced with take-it-or-leave-it, the buyer takes it nearly every time. Notice, in comparing observations from the two diﬀerent experimental designs, that the process is
governed by “fairness” in the sense of the rules of conduct given the circumstances,
not whether the outcomes are fair.
Pecorino and Van Boening (2010) embed the ultimatum game in the context of a
litigation dispute. A plaintiﬀ and a defendant are bargaining over how to split the
cost savings of not going to trial, $0.75 to the plaintiﬀ and $0.75 to the defendant.
To avoid this cost, the defendant makes a pre-trial settlement oﬀer to the plaintiﬀ. If
the plaintiﬀ accepts the settlement oﬀer, neither incurs the trial costs. The plaintiﬀ
receives the oﬀer as payment and the defendant incurs the cost of his wrongdoing
(which is subtracted as a lump sum given to him by the experimenter). If the
plaintiﬀ rejects the oﬀer, then the plaintiﬀ receives a judgment from which the
trial costs are subtracted, and the defendant incurs the trial cost and the cost of
judgment. In the baseline comparison treatment, a Proposer and a Responder play
a traditional ultimatum game with M = $1.50. Both versions are repeated for 10
rounds.
In the embedded game, the median oﬀer by the defendant is 8% of $1.50, or 12c.
In Pecorino and Van Boening’s replication of the traditional ultimatum game, the
median Proposer oﬀer is 50% of $1.50, or 75c. For similar oﬀers of 0–25c, 23% of the
oﬀers are rejected in the litigation game and 100% in the traditional game. Thus,
defendants oﬀer less and plaintiﬀs accept more often than their counterparts in the
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traditional ultimatum game. How does the TMS framework help us understand
this? In the litigation game, the motives are no longer mixed. The proposing defendant is attempting to avoid a loss with an oﬀer to the plaintiﬀ which corresponds to
the plaintiﬀ avoiding the cost of a trial. While the experimenter has thrown them
into a dispute, albeit an unavoidable one (which might explain the high rejection
rates of 21–25%), mutually avoiding a cost is not a matter of beneﬁcence on the
part of the defendant.16 In the litigation game, prudence in the form of accepting
an oﬀer equal to her opportunity cost is a virtue for the plaintiﬀ, and not a matter
of how beneﬁcent the defendant is in her oﬀer. Regardless of what happens, the
defendant is minimizing the depletions from his upfront windfall.

6

Trust Games: Single Play

Consider the following two-person game commonly studied by experimental
economists in a variety of forms and summarized in Figure 1. Person 1 chooses to
either (a) end the interaction sending each person on their way with an additional
$10 or (b) forego his sure $10 and turn the decision making over to Person 2. If
Person 1 chooses (b), then Person 2 decides between (a ) the experimenter paying
her $25 and Person 1 $15 or (b ) the experimenter paying her $40 and sending
Person 1 on his way with nothing by way of the outcome from the interaction in
this game.17
If Person 1 is fully aware of the choice that Person 2 faces, and vice versa, how
do we understand what two anonymous people do when faced with this situation?
Adam Smith notes that unless the situation calls for a rule of justice “our conduct
should rather be directed by a certain idea of propriety, by a certain taste for a
particular tenor of conduct, than by any regard to a precise maxim or rule” (III.6.10,
p. 175). If that sounds fairly “loose, vague, and indeterminate” (III.6.11, p. 175),
then that is because “there are no rules by knowledge of which we can infallibly be
taught to act upon all occasions with prudence, with just magnanimity, or proper
beneﬁcence” (III.vi.11, p. 176). Consequently, Smith implicitly recognizes here that
the rule a particular individual might follow can be expected to vary with the
circumstances that constitute particular “occasions.”
16
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Buchan et al. (2005) observe similar diﬀerences between ultimatum games over gains versus
losses, though to not such a stark extent.
Experimentalists commonly pay subjects a ﬁxed show-up payment when they arrive, that is,
for each person to keep whatever the outcomes of the subsequent experiment.
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Figure 1. A two-person trust game in extensive form.
This rules out as being pertinent for all occasions the modern economist’s rather
precise and accurate concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, which predicts that
Person 1 would immediately end the game and receive $10 because, if given the
opportunity to make the decision, Person 2 would choose $40 over $25 for herself,
thereby leaving Person 1 with nothing. Fortunately, “[n]ature,. . . [has not] abandoned us entirely to the delusions of self-love. Our continual observations upon the
conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is ﬁt and proper either to be done or to be avoided” (III.4.7, p. 159).
What general rules of ﬁt and proper behavior are applicable to this game and
to the experiences of this community of participants? And what would the rules
predict? Let is ﬁrst consider, as subgame perfection does, Person 2. If given the
opportunity to make a decision, Person 2 would “endeavor to examine [her] own
conduct as [she] imagines any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it.
If, upon placing [herself] in his situation, [she] thoroughly enter[s] into all the passions and motives which inﬂuenced it, [she] approve[s] of it, by sympathy with the
approbation of this supposed equitable judge. If, otherwise, [she] enter[s] into his
disapprobation, and condemn[s] it” (III.1.2, p. 110).
In this game the question is whether, by sympathy with the impartial spectator,
would Person 2 approve or disapprove of choosing (a ) and approve or disapprove
choosing of (b ). Choosing (a ) yields a higher payment from the experimenter to
both individuals as Person 1 forewent a sure $10 for both. A fair and impartial
spectator could thus approve of (a ); both are better oﬀ because of the actions of
Person 1 and Person 2. Choosing (b ), however, sends Person 1 home with nothing
after foregoing a sure $10. In light of (a ), Person 2 is better oﬀ, regardless of what
she does, because Person 1 passed the play to her. Thus however anonymous the
participants may be in this interaction, an impartial spectator could reasonably
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disapprove of (b ). Now consider Person 1. From past experience with friends and
classmates, he expects that “[n]ature, which formed men for that mutual kindness,
so necessary for their happiness, renders every man the peculiar object of kindness,
to the person to whom he himself has been kind” (VI.ii.1.19, p. 225; hereafter,
Principle of Reciprocal Beneﬁcence). In other words, experience has taught him
that if he kindly passes the play for a mutual gain for the both of them, a Person
2 may kindly reciprocate him, the person to whom he himself has just been kind.
But must the impartial spectator disapprove of (b )? Not necessarily, if our conduct is indeed directed by a certain idea of propriety and not a precise rule. Recall
that Person 1 has the choice of (a) or (b), and if Person 1 chooses (b), Person 2
has the choice of (a ) or (b ). An impartial spectator could reason that the experimenter’s rules are the rules, and everyone, including Person 1, knows the rules and
has agreed to participate in this experiment. Thus, if Person 1 willingly chooses (b)
an impartial spectator could also approve of (b ), for if the experimenter did not
wish to observe whether or not Person 2 might actually choose (b ) the experimenter
would not have given her the option.
TMS thus informs the experimental economist that the rules of interaction in the
trust game merely “present us with a general idea of the perfection we ought to
aim at, [rather] than aﬀord us any certain and infallible directions for acquiring it”
(III.6.11, p. 175–176), and this general idea of the perfection is founded upon our
autobiographical experiences “of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties,
our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of” (III.4.8, p. 159).
Diﬀerent people, either with diﬀerent experiences, or diﬀerent interpretations as to
how their experience applies to the game in question, may converge on diﬀerent
responses, especially in a one-shot game.
In the laboratory the replicable facts from three diﬀerent studies are that of 98
ﬁrst movers, 52 choose (a) and 46 choose (b), and that of the 46 second movers
who have the opportunity to make a decision, 31 (67%) choose (a ) and 15 (33%)
choose (b ) (McCabe and Smith, 2000; Cox and Deck, 2005; Gillies and Rigdon,
2008). So while TMS modestly makes no speciﬁc prediction about what people will
do in the trust game,18 experimental economics can inform Smith’s theory of the
general principles with which impartial spectators approve and disapprove of (a),
18

The critic who asserts that a Smithian analysis of this game is unhelpful because it does not
make a speciﬁc prediction has the burden of providing and demonstrating a set of rules for
this interaction that are, in the words of Adam Smith, “precise, accurate, and indispensable”
(TMS, III.6.11, p. 175). When the experimental games on which we are reporting ﬁrst began
to be studied in the 1980s, the predictions of game theory performed very poorly.
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(b), (a ), and (b ). By randomly assigning participants to conditions with systematic
variations in the procedures, we can trace out the contextual principles that excite
and mediate whether more impartial spectators approve or disapprove of (a), (b),
(a ), and (b ).
Typically in a laboratory experiment, subjects make decisions anonymously with
respect to each other, but the experimenter knows by name what each subject did
so as to pay them (privately) what they earned. This is the protocol for the data
reported above. In a second condition, Cox and Deck (2005) implement an elaborate procedure to ensure that the subjects also make their decisions anonymously
with respect to the experimenter. The experimenter cannot match decisions to speciﬁc individuals. Interestingly, this change in procedures asymmetrically eﬀects the
decisions of Persons 1 and 2. First movers pass the play by choosing (b) at the
same rate in both conditions. However, 10 out of 14 (71%) second movers choose
(b ) with double anonymity but only 8 out of 25 (32%) choose (b ) with single
anonymity. It seems that increasing the private character of the interaction is one
aspect of the context that excites more impartial spectators to approve of (b ).
An unresolved question is why Person 1’s do not anticipate that Person 2’s are
more disposed to choosing (b’) over (a’) with double anonymity.19 Hence, empirical
support for Smith’s Principle of Reciprocal Beneﬁcence is strong under single, but
not double anonymity; it seems important whether or not people other than your
matched counterpart can know your behavior.
Gillies and Rigdon (2008) consider how knowledge of the payoﬀs aﬀects the play
of Persons 1 and 2. In what they call a “Private Game,” each person only knows
their own payoﬀs associated with (a), (b), (a ), and (b ). As shown in Figure 2,
Person 1 only knows that he receives $10 from choosing (a) and that if he passes
the play, Person 2 is choosing between $15 and $0 for him. The catch is that Person
1 does not know what Person 2’s payoﬀs are from choosing (a ) and (b ) and Person
1 knows that Person 2 does not know what his payoﬀs are from choosing (a ) and
(b ). Likewise, Person 2 does not know what Person 1’s payoﬀ is from choosing (a),
only that her payoﬀ is $10 from Person 1 choosing (a).
Without knowledge on how his decision aﬀects Person 2, Person 1 is unable to
conclude from past experience that Person 2 will reciprocate a trusting action of
(b) with a trustworthy one of (a ), and that is what Gillies and Rigdon observe.
19

Person 2’s conduct in choosing (a ), under double anonymity, may be merely praiseworthy and
thus weakened in conduct value compared with single anonymity; similarly, Person 2’s choice
of (b ) may be less discouraged by being merely blameworthy compared with single anonymity.
Any such second order eﬀects may be more diﬃcult for Person 1’s to anticipate.
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Figure 2. Private knowledge of payoﬀs in the trust game.
Fifteen of 45 (33%) ﬁrst movers play down in the “Private Game” as opposed to
21 of 50 (42%) ﬁrst movers do in the full common knowledge game.
More dramatic is the response of Person 2’s impartial spectators. Only 3 of 15
(20%) second movers play (a ) in the “Private Game” in contrast to 14 of 21 (67%)
who do so in the full common knowledge game. More impartial spectators approve
of (b ), taking the higher payoﬀ of $40, when they are unaware of what Person 1
forewent in choosing (b) and unaware of what Person 1 will receive ($0). Since neither player knows the payoﬀ of other, the sentiments of praise and praiseworthiness,
and the Principle of Reciprocal Beneﬁcence, cannot enter into judging the propriety
of each other’s actions; hence their self-love cannot be “humbled” by the Impartial
Spectator and is necessarily more important under such game circumstances.
In the complete knowledge version of the game in Figure 1, Gillies and Rigdon
also consider in a separate treatment condition how Person 2’s behave when they
are asked to make their decision assuming that Person 1 has chosen (b). Person 2’s,
however, are only paid based upon those decisions if Person 1 actually chooses (b).
If Person 1 chooses (a), then Person 2’s choice is not implemented. In this treatment
the impartial spectators are hypothetically invoked as opposed to being explicitly
excited with Person 1’s actual choice of (b). Whereas 14 of 21 (67%) second movers
choose (a ) when Person 1 has actually chosen (b), only 20 of 43 (47%) Person
2’s choose (a ) when asked to assume Person 1 has chosen (b).20 The distinction
made in these experiments correspond to games played in extensive versus normal
(or strategic; i.e., contingent play) form. Traditional game theory treated the two
as equivalent, but many experimental studies have reported data rejecting this
20

Casari and Cason (2009) observe similar behavior in a trust game with diﬀerent parameters.
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postulated equivalence.21 The two game forms are cognitively much diﬀerent in
that in the extensive form Person 1 conveys to Person 2 his intentions before the
latter is required to choose. TMS is particularly relevant in this interpretation
because intentions are central to the capacity of the Impartial Spectator to form
an appropriate judgment of the other person’s action, and therefore in judging an
appropriate response.

7

Trust Games: Repeat Play

Figure 3 presents another simple trust game that has been used to study single
as well as repeat play versions of the same basic stage game. In single play, if
Person 1 chooses to end the game, each receives $20; if Person 1 passes to Person 2,
the latter chooses between (a ) $25 for each, or (b ) $15 for Person 1 and $30 for
Person 2. As in the ﬁrst trust game above (Figure 1), the SPE is for Person 1 to
end the game and each leaves with $20 apiece, but in the laboratory we observe

Figure 3. Another two-person trust game in extensive form.
63% passing to Person 2. And twice as many people in the Person 2 position (65%)
choose (a ) over (b ). As before, both persons are choosing cooperatively in a manner
consistent with the Principle of Reciprocal Beneﬁcence in TMS. McCabe et al.
(2003) use this game to answer the following question: How will these results be
aﬀected if in a second treatment condition, Person 1 cannot voluntarily choose
between ending the game and passing to Person 2, with passing being required of
Person 1? Person 2 faces the same alternatives as before, but sees that Person 1
21

For a discussion and several references, see Smith (2008, pp. 264–267) and for earlier experiment
results see McCabe et al. (1996).
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gives up nothing. Consequently, under these conditions, the Impartial Spectator in
Person 2 is prevented from forming the same intentional “kindness” judgment of
the conduct of person 1 as in the ﬁrst treatment. Consistent with this reasoning,
under the second treatment conditions the results from the ﬁrst experiment are
reversed: now only 33% of the Person 2’s choose (a ) over (b ).22
Rigdon et al. (2007) have also studied behavior in repeat play of the stage game
in Figure 3. Their experiments examine decision behavior under two diﬀerent conditions that vary only the protocols for matching subject pairs after each round
of play. In both the protocols, the subjects are not informed as to the number of
repetitions; without warning, play is stopped after 20 rounds. In the ﬁrst protocol
the subjects are simply re-paired at random. In the second a scoring algorithm uses
their previous decisions to enable all Person 1’s and Person 2’s to be separately
rank ordered from most cooperative to least. The highest in each rank are then
matched with each other for the next round; the second highest are matched with
each other for the next round, and so on down the list. A cooperative choice by
Person 1 means that he passed to Person 2; a cooperative choice by Person 2 occurs
whenever option (a ) is selected. It is very important to keep in mind that the subjects in these experiments were not informed of the matching procedure. In both
the treatments all the participants were told simply that they would be re-paired
with a person in the room each period. In all sessions there were 16 people in the
room with eight Person 1’s (and eight Person 2’s) to be re-paired either at random,
or by application of the scoring algorithm.
If indeed “kindness begets kindness” as in Adam Smith’s Principle of Reciprocal Beneﬁcence, then the scoring rule allows those interacting over the 20 repetitions to “discover” by experience that they are in an environment characterized
by “kindness.” Over time each person’s Impartial Spectator would be updated and
reﬂect any experiential tendencies toward kind behavior. Rigdon et al. (2007) had
no assured expectation as to how eﬀective the scoring rule would be. This is why
they used a comparison control that implemented random re-pairing. An open question was how eﬀective the two protocols would be in separating the two diﬀerent
pools of subjects with respect to their frequency of cooperative choice.23
22
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But remarkably, many Person 2’s still choose to be generous to Person 1’s perhaps leaving
ample room for the TMS sentiment of acting in a praise-worthy manner even without the
implied praise when kindness is returned by kindness.
The research reported in Rigdon et al. (2007) was done at the University of Arizona at the turn
of the millennium, appearing as a working paper in 2002, and was delayed in publication. Why?
Principally, the procedure — subjects not being informed of the rank order rule for re-matching
pairs — was the source of many explanations and discussions with seminar participants and in
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The data show that the primary research hypothesis was strongly supported as
the two treatment groups bi-furcated signiﬁcantly across repeat trials in exhibiting cooperative responses: on trials 1–5, the ratio of percent cooperative choice
by Person 1’s in the treatment to the percent cooperation in the random control
was 1.05; for Person 2’s, the ratio was 1.10; i.e., essentially very little treatment
diﬀerence in the ﬁrst ﬁve trials. But cooperation steadily improved, so that in the
last ﬁve trials, 16–20, these ratios respectively were 1.94 and 1.63, corresponding to
increases respectively of 1.94/1.05 = 185% for Person 1’s and 1.63/1.10 = 150% for
Person 2’s. According to TMS the latter are less than the former because regardless of treatment, Person 2’s, experiencing the largess of Person 1’s, tend to honor
the principle that “Actions of a beneﬁcent tendency, which proceed from proper
motives, seem alone to require reward; because such alone are the approved objects
of gratitude, or excite the sympathetic gratitude of the spectator” (TMS, II.ii.1.1,
p. 78).
Rigdon et al. (2007) also report the ﬁnding of a very pronounced regularity in the
behavior of people in both the treatments: the individual decisions of Person 1’s to
trust or not, and for Person 2’s to respond trustworthily or not, on the ﬁrst trial
was strongly and signiﬁcantly related to their subsequent tendency to show trust
or trustworthy behavior in repeat interaction. Thus, in Equation (2) we can say
that in these experiments, each person after reading the instructions, and entering
into the ﬁrst round of play, makes a decision conditional upon her history, Hi (0),
and his/her anticipated future interactive behavior, H(x). What we learn across
all the subjects is that their sympathetic state is marked indelibly by their ﬁrst
decision, and is predictive of their subsequent behavior in the remaining 19 trials.
In the language of game theory, the subject is “typed” by his decision on the ﬁrst
the editor-refereeing process. Many had diﬃculty grasping why we did not make the comparison
with subjects given full knowledge of the cooperative matching procedure. There is a body
of constructivist economic theory — irrelevant and distractive from the perspective of this
study — that argues that a small in-group of cooperators can invade a population of defectors,
and being able to identify each other, outperform their out-group peers. Yes, and if our subjects
knew the circumstances of their matching and we observed more cooperation than in the
randomly re-paired group what would we learn? Only, we feared, that when it is made plain to
people that in repeat interaction cooperation is individually optimal, then people are likely to
choose optimally. In that case we would learn yet again that in games that essentially reduce
rationally to games against nature, people tend to go to the top of the proﬁt hill. If this exercise
is to be meaningful, the question must be what will people do if they ﬁnd themselves — without
knowledge of why — in a climate of relative cooperation, compared to a climate of relative
defection? Will cooperation and proﬁtability build experientially and “insensibly” in the former
à la TMS or will it deteriorate in attempted mutual exploitation à la game theoretic self-loving
behavior?
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trial, and his type signiﬁcantly accounts for his subsequent decisions although these
vary signiﬁcantly with his subsequent experience and the experimental treatment
condition.24

8

Concluding Remarks

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is much more than a source of ornamental quotations for modern research in economics. TMS is a primary source of
insights for understanding what modern, logico-deductive economics cannot account
for — our human passions and motives, the ediﬁce upon which our morality is built.
Adam Smith is a theorist in the original sense of the Greek word theoria, meaning
“to view or behold.” He importantly begins, not ends, with acute observations on
everyday human intercourse qua axiom, which he then organizes as elements in a
rule-governed system of morality. Rules of conduct, not outcomes, are the focus of
his analysis. Adam Smith uses the word society 157 times in the TMS, roughly
once every other page. Why? Because his overarching concern with understanding
human rules of conduct is how, in an ever-ﬂuxional world, society orders itself via
morality, which is “indeed the result of human action but not the execution of any
human design” (Ferguson, 1767, p. 102).
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